Malaysian voters made a historical decision in May 2018, ushering in what observers termed a “Malay political tsunami” by displacing the UMNO government’s decades-long rule. This paper argues that the spirit of inclusiveness played a crucial role in the first transition of power in Malaysia. Moreover, the inclusive representation of major ethnic groups in the multi-racial state by the winning Alliance Hope coalition was a key factor leading to the transition. This paper also examines the political development in Malaysia, from (...) the beginning of inclusive politics in the early stage of its independence, to the decline of inclusiveness from the 1970s to 1990s, to the collapse of the inclusive politics since 2008 when the DAP produced a major victory over the MCA in the May 2008 elections. Finally, this paper also explores the challenges of the new ruling Alliance Hope in Malaysia. Keywords : Ethno-politics, inclusiveness, UMNO, MCA, MIC, Alliance Hope. (shrink)

Les uns sont fascinés par la hardiesse et la constance de sa pensée, les autres la rejettent au motif que sa métaphysique est extravagante et son raisonnement obscur. Mais alors, quel profit tirer de la lecture de l'œuvre de Plotin? Mieux que tout autre, Plotin réussit à faire le point sur les doctrines philosophiques qui l'ont précédé, y compris le scepticisme. Et il y parvient avec une perspicacité et une originalité exceptionnelles, tout en restant un strict partisan du platonisme. Interpréter (...) Plotin dans sa confrontation avec ses prédécesseurs, c'est prendre part à un passionnant débat et soumettre à une évaluation les acquis et les limites de chacun. Telle est la démarche à laquelle invite ce livre qui est consacré à la théorie du savoir. Après que le doute sceptique ait ébranlé les théories antérieures, Plotin innove en faisant coïncider savoir objectif et connaissance de soi. Ce geste théorique, ses antécédents et ses conséquences sont au cœur de ce travail de recherche"--P. [4] of cover. (shrink)

Türk milleti dünyanın en zengin kültürüne sahip olduğu gibi en zengin diline de sahiptir. Ancak daha eski çağların dil verileri ne yazık ki, yazılı vesikalara aktarılmamış, karanlık dönem olarak kalmıştır. O bakımdan Türkçenin Altay veya Proto-Türk devri hakkında bilgimiz sınırlıdır ve sahip olduğumuz kelime sayısı da çok azdır. Eski Türkçe adlanan bu lügat sadece Orhun-Yenisey yazıtları ile tespit edilen ve Uygur yazıtları ile devam eden Türkçenin malum en eski yazılı kaynaklarının sözlüğüdür. Yer yüzündeki diller arasında Türkçenin yerine baktığımızda, Ural-Altay dil (...) grubunun Altay koluna bağlı bir dil olduğu ve geçmişinin M.Ö. 4000’li yıllara indiği görülür. Bu tarihten, M.Ö. 5. yüzyıla kadar olan dönem genel olarak Altay veya Proto-Türk devri olarak adlandırılır. Bu dönemde Türkçe ile ilgili az da olsa birtakım dil kalıntılarına rastlanır; ancak bunun yeterli olmaması ve bu dönemden bize yazılı herhangi bir metnin ulaşmaması, bu çağların karanlık dönem olarak adlandırılmasına neden olmuştur. Bu dönemde Türkçenin Çuvaşça ve Yakutça ile henüz ayrılmadığı, hattâ daha eskiye gittiğimizde Moğol, Mançu, Tunguz dilleriyle aynı çatı altında toplandığı varsayılır. Bilindiği gibi daha önce Eski Türkçe döneminin ayrı ayrı metinlerini kapsayan birçok sözlük çalışması yapılmıştır. Ancak bu sözlükler birbirinden bağımsız hazırlanmış, bir kısmı Göktürk dönemi ile Orhun Yazıtlarını, diğer bir kısmı da Uygur dönemi ile bu dönem metinlerini temel almıştır. Eski Türkçe bir bütün olarak düşünüldüğünde, bu sözlüklerin bazı yönlerden yetersiz kaldığı bir gerçektir. Bu çalışmanın genel amacı, daha önce ortaya konulan Eski Türkçe sözlükleri bir araya getirerek Göktürk ve Uygur dönemlerini birlikte ele alan, daha kapsamlı ve tek bir sözlük oluşturmaktır. O bakımdan daha önce meydana getirilen sözlük çalışmaları temel alınarak ortaya yeni bir sözlük konulmuştur. (shrink)

Miller, Truog, and Brock have recently argued that the “dead donor rule,” the requirement that donors be determined to be dead before vital organs are procured for transplantation, cannot withstand ethical scrutiny. In their view, the dead donor rule is inconsistent with existing life-saving practices of organ transplantation, lacks a cogent ethical rationale, and is not necessary for maintenance of public trust in organ transplantation. In this paper, the second of these claims will be evaluated. (The first and third are (...) not addressed.) The claim that the dead donor rule lacks a cogent ethical rationale will be shown to be an expression of the contemporary rejection of the moral significance of the traditional distinction between killing and allowing to die. The moral significance of this traditional distinction, and the associated norm that doctors should not kill their patients, will be defended, and this critique of it shown to be unsuccessful. (shrink)

Recent work on the hole argument in general relativity by Weatherall has drawn attention to the neglected concept of models’ representational capacities. I argue for several theses about the structure of these capacities, including that they should be understood not as many-to-one relations from models to the world, but in general as many-to-many relations constrained by the models’ isomorphisms. I then compare these ideas with a recent argument by Belot for the claim that some isometries “generate new possibilities” in general (...) relativity. Philosophical orthodoxy, by contrast, denies this. Properly understanding the role of representational capacities, I argue, reveals how Belot’s rejection of orthodoxy does not go far enough, and makes better sense of our practices in theorizing about spacetime. (shrink)

Stephen Hawking, among others, has proposed that the topological stability of a property of space-time is a necessary condition for it to be physically significant. What counts as stable, however, depends crucially on the choice of topology. Some physicists have thus suggested that one should find a canonical topology, a single ‘right’ topology for every inquiry. While certain such choices might be initially motivated, some little-discussed examples of Robert Geroch and some propositions of my own show that the main candidates—and (...) each possible choice, to some extent—faces the horns of a no-go result. I suggest that instead of trying to decide what the ‘right’ topology is for all problems, one should let the details of particular types of problems guide the choice of an appropriate topology. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Book II, Chapter viii of Locke' Essay is a unified, self-consistent whole, and that the appearance of inconsistency is due largely to anachronistic misreadings and misunderstandings. The key to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that the former are, while the latter are not, real properties, i.e., properties that exist in bodies independently of being perceived. Once the distinction is properly understood, it becomes clear that Locke's arguments for it are simple, valid (...) and (in one case) persuasive as well. (shrink)

Intertheoretic reduction in physics aspires to be both to be explanatory and perfectly general: it endeavors to explain why an older, simpler theory continues to be as successful as it is in terms of a newer, more sophisticated theory, and it aims to relate or otherwise account for as many features of the two theories as possible. Despite often being introduced as straightforward cases of intertheoretic reduction, candidate accounts of the reduction of general relativity to Newtonian gravitation have either been (...) insufficiently general or rigorous, or have not clearly been able to explain the empirical success of Newtonian gravitation. Building on work by Ehlers and others, I propose a different account of the reduction relation that is perfectly general and meets the explanatory demand one would make of it. In doing so, I highlight the role that a topology on the collection of all spacetimes plays in defining the relation, and how the selection of the topology corresponds with broader or narrower classes of observables that one demands be well-approximated in the limit. (shrink)

Can quantum theory provide examples of metaphysical indeterminacy, indeterminacy that obtains in the world itself, independently of how one represents the world in language or thought? We provide a positive answer assuming just one constraint of orthodox quantum theory: the eigenstate-eigenvalue link. Our account adds a modal condition to preclude spurious indeterminacy in the presence of superselection sectors. No other extant account of metaphysical indeterminacy in quantum theory meets these demands.

Traditionally, logic has been the dominant formal method within philosophy. Are logical methods still dominant today, or have the types of formal methods used in philosophy changed in recent times? To address this question, we coded a sample of philosophy papers from the late 2000s and from the late 2010s for the formal methods they used. The results indicate that the proportion of papers using logical methods remained more or less constant over that time period but the proportion of papers (...) using probabilistic methods was approximately three times higher in the late 2010s than it was in the late 2000s. Further analyses explored this change by looking more closely at specific methods, specific levels of technical engagement, and specific subdisciplines within philosophy. These analyses indicate that the increasing proportion of papers using probabilistic methods was pervasive, not confined to particular probabilistic methods, levels of sophistication, or subdisciplines. (shrink)

Humans have always sought to change their environment—building houses, monuments, temples, and roads. In the process, they have remade the fabric of the world into newly functional objects that are also works of art to be admired. In this second edition of his popular Existential Pleasures of Engineering, Samuel Florman explores how engineers think and feel about their profession. A deeply insightful and refreshingly unique text, this book corrects the myth that engineering is cold and passionless. Indeed, Florman celebrates (...) engineering not only crucial and fundamental but also vital and alive he views it as a response to some of our deepest impulses, an endeavor rich in spiritual and sensual rewards. Opposing the "anti-technology" stance, Florman gives readers a practical, creative, and even amusing philosophy of engineering that boasts of pride in his craft. (shrink)

This article describes and defends an inclusive anti-canonical approach to the study of the history of philosophy. Its proposal, based on an analysis of the nature of the history of philosophy and the value of engaging in the practice, is this: The history of philosophy is the history of rationally justified, systematic answers to philosophical questions; studying this subject is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable; these benefits do not derive from the imposition of a canon—indeed, there should be no canon; (...) the absence of a canon leaves room for a thousand courses on a thousand different topics with a thousand different narrative structures; but a good syllabus should be relevantly diverse in a way that fits the thematic arc of the course; and this prescription for the discipline is inclusive, in ways that can only strengthen and enliven it for future generations. (shrink)

According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, it is more difficult to justify doing harm than it is to justify allowing harm. Enabling harm consists in withdrawing an obstacle that would, if left in place, prevent a pre-existing causal sequence from leading to foreseen harm. There has been a lively debate concerning the moral status of enabling harm. According to some (e.g. McMahan, Vihvelin and Tomkow), many cases of enabling harm are morally indistinguishable from doing harm. Others (e.g. Foot, (...) Hanser) support the Equivalence Hypothesis, according to which enabling harm is morally equivalent to allowing harm. Here I argue that there is every reason to embrace, and no reason to reject, the Equivalence Hypothesis. (shrink)

We offer a framework for organizing the literature regarding the debates revolving around infinite idealizations in science, and a short summary of the contributions to this special issue.

How can inferences from models to the phenomena they represent be justified when those models represent only imperfectly? Pierre Duhem considered just this problem, arguing that inferences from mathematical models of phenomena to real physical applications must also be demonstrated to be approximately correct when the assumptions of the model are only approximately true. Despite being little discussed among philosophers, this challenge was taken up by mathematicians and physicists both contemporaneous with and subsequent to Duhem, yielding a novel and rich (...) mathematical theory of stability with epistemological consequences. (shrink)

The replication or reproducibility crisis in psychological science has renewed attention to philosophical aspects of its methodology. I provide herein a new, functional account of the role of replication in a scientific discipline: to undercut the underdetermination of scientific hypotheses from data, typically by hypotheses that connect data with phenomena. These include hypotheses that concern sampling error, experimental control, and operationalization. How a scientific hypothesis could be underdetermined in one of these ways depends on a scientific discipline’s epistemic goals, theoretical (...) development, material constraints, institutional context, and their interconnections. I illustrate how these apply to the case of psychological science. I then contrast this “bottom-up” account with “top-down” accounts, which assume that the role of replication in a particular science, such as psychology, must follow from a uniform role that it plays in science generally. Aside from avoiding unaddressed problems with top-down accounts, my bottom-up account also better explains the variability of importance of replication of various types across different scientific disciplines. (shrink)

In 1827, Lady Mary Shepherd published Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, which offers both an argument for the existence of a world of external bodies existing outside our minds and a criticism of Berkeley's argument for idealism in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. In this paper, I evaluate Margaret Atherton's criticisms of Shepherd's case against Berkeley, and provide reasons for thinking that, although Shepherd's particular criticisms of Berkeley do not succeed, she correctly identifies an (...) important problem to which Berkeley's reasoning is subject. (shrink)

The clock hypothesis of relativity theory equates the proper time experienced by a point particle along a timelike curve with the length of that curve as determined by the metric. Is it possible to prove that particular types of clocks satisfy the clock hypothesis, thus genuinely measure proper time, at least approximately? Because most real clocks would be enormously complicated to study in this connection, focusing attention on an idealized light clock is attractive. The present paper extends and generalized partial (...) results along these lines with a theorem showing that, for any timelike curve in any spacetime, there is a light clock that measures the curve’s length as accurately and regularly as one wishes. (shrink)

The vast majority of philosophers and legal theorists who have thought about the issue agree that there is such a thing as a moral right to privacy. However, there is little or no theoretical consensus about the nature of this right. According to reductionists, the right to privacy amounts to nothing more than a cluster of property rights and rights over the person, and therefore plays no autonomous explanatory role in moral theory (Thomson 1975, Davis 1959). Among non-reductionists, there are (...) almost as many accounts of the right to privacy as there are synagogues in the old town of Jerusalem. For one group of non-reductionists (perhaps the majority), the right to privacy is properly understood as a right of control, a form of autonomy. Within this group, some think that the right to privacy is the right to control information about oneself (Westin 1967, Beardsley 1971, Gerstein 1978, Fried 1970, Moore 2003), while others insist that it is the right to control access to oneself (Parker 1974, Scanlon 1975, Rachels 1975, Reiman 1976, Van den Haag 1971). For another group of non-reductionists, the right to privacy is the right to cognitive and/or physical inaccessibility (Gavison 1980, Garrett 1974, Allen 1988). Though these are by far the most widely adopted non-reductionist accounts of the relevant right, they are by no means the only ones currently on offer. There are hybrid accounts according to which the right to privacy is a cluster of various rights of control (Inness 1992) or a cluster of various rights of control and restricted access (DeCew 1997). And according to an influential “information-based” account, the right to privacy 1 is defined as the right that others not possess undocumented personal information about the right-holder (Parent 1983a; 1983b). The purpose of this paper is to bring some order to this theoretical chaos. On my view, none of these accounts of the right to privacy is accurate.. (shrink)

The various proponents of the DDA differ over how it should be understood. It might be thought that the distinction between doing and allowing reduces to the distinction between action and inaction. As against this, Philippa Foot has argued that some actions, such as pulling the plug on an artificial respirator, should be treated as “allowings.” On her view, the relevant distinction is primarily one between initiating or sustaining a harmful causal sequence, and allowing or enabling a harmful causal sequence (...) to run its course. The view that this is the proper interpretation of the DDA has been challenged by Warren Quinn, who argues that Foot’s distinction either fails to account for our considered intuitions in some cases or collapses back into the action/inaction distinction. Quinn offers an interpretation of the DDA that is closer to the action/inaction distinction, but in which intentions are made to play a significant role. (shrink)

The replicability crisis refers to the apparent failures to replicate both important and typical positive experimental claims in psychological science and biomedicine, failures which have gained increasing attention in the past decade. In order to provide evidence that there is a replicability crisis in the first place, scientists have developed various measures of replication that help quantify or “count” whether one study replicates another. In this nontechnical essay, I critically examine five types of replication measures used in the landmark article (...) “Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science” (Open Science Collaboration, Science, 349, ac4716, 2015) based on the following techniques: subjective assessment, null hypothesis significance testing, comparing effect sizes, comparing the original effect size with the replication confidence interval, and meta-analysis. The first four, I argue, remain unsatisfactory for a variety of conceptual or formal reasons, even taking into account various improvements. By contrast, at least one version of the meta-analytic measure does not suffer from these problems. It differs from the others in rejecting dichotomous conclusions, the assumption that one study replicates another or not simpliciter. I defend it from other recent criticisms, concluding however that it is not a panacea for all the multifarious problems that the crisis has highlighted. (shrink)

One of the more interesting philosophical debates in the seventeenth century concerned the nature and explanation of qualities. In order to understand these debates, it is important to place them in their proper historical-philosophical context. This book chapter starts with theoretical background in the work of Aristotle and the atomists, and then moves on to survey various theories of motion and rest, light, color, and sound, as well as the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, as represented in the work (...) of such figures as Berkeley, Boyle, Charleton, Cordemoy, Descartes, Desgabets, Galileo, Gassendi, Hobbes, Locke, Malebranche, Newton, Régis, Rohault, and Sennert. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone abordar la obra de Adam Smith con el objeto de identificar una posible “teoría sobre la igualdad” en el corpus del filósofo escocés. Nuestro planteamiento cuestiona el ideario colectivo en torno a este autor, según el cual se lo caracteriza como cercano al anti-igualitarismo de ciertas corrientes liberales. Basándonos en investigaciones hechas en los últimos años por algunos estudiosos de Smith, expondremos argumentos e ideas presentes en su obra que se pueden asociar a posiciones igualitaristas (...) y que muestran que su postura sobre este tema es más compleja de lo que se cree. En esta línea, con el fin de evidenciar la posición de Smith acerca de la igualdad, presentaremos su concepción sobre el surgimiento de la desigualdad y ciertas ideas plasmadas en La Riqueza de las Naciones y en Teoría de los Sentimientos Morales relevantes para la discusión. En esta tarea, tomaremos como principal referente el trabajo de Samuel Fleischacker, cuya interpretación de Smith -que será complementada con análisis propios- tenemos también el objeto de difundir. (shrink)

In this collection of essays Samuel Wheeler discusses Derrida and other “deconstructive” thinkers from the perspective of an analytic philosopher willing to treat deconstruction as philosophy, taking it seriously enough to look for and analyze its arguments. The essays focus on the theory of meaning, truth, interpretation, metaphor, and the relationship of language to the world. Wheeler links the thought of Derrida to that of Davidson and argues for close affinities among Derrida, Quine, de Man, and Wittgenstein. He also (...) demonstrates the propinquity of Plato and Derrida and shows that New Criticism shares deconstruction’s conception of language. Of the twelve essays in the collection, four are published here for the first time. The fundamental resemblance between Derrida and such analytic thinkers as Quine, Wittgenstein, and Davidson, the author argues, is that they deny the possibility of meanings as self-interpreting media constituting thoughts and intentions. Derrida argues that some form of magic language has determined the very project of philosophy, and his arguments work out the consequences of denying that there are such self-interpreting mental contents. In addition, Derrida and Davidson agree in denying any “given.” Without a given, questions about realism and idealism cease to have a point. Derrida and Davidson are both committed to the textuality of all significant marks, whether in neurons or on paper. They argue that there is no mode of representation more direct than language. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide what I believe to be Descartes's own solution to the problem of the Cartesian Circle. As I argue, Descartes thinks he can have certain knowledge of the premises of the Third Meditation proof of God's existence and veracity (i.e., the 3M-Proof) without presupposing God's existence. The key, as Broughton (1984) once argued, is that the premises of the 3M-Proof are knowable by the natural light. The major objection to this "natural light" gambit is that Descartes (...) identifies the natural light with the faculty of clear and distinct perception, a faculty that cannot be known to be reliable in advance of the 3M-Proof. I explain that Descartes distinguishes between three kinds of clear and distinction perceptions depending on their source; the senses, the imagination, or the intellect. I claim that although the First Meditation is designed to cast doubt on the clear and distinct perceptions of the senses and of the imagination, it is not designed to cast doubt on the clear and distinct perceptions of the intellect. The "natural light" gambit relies on the assumption that the natural light, by which propositions can be certainly known without presupposing knowledge of God's existence, is to be identified with the faculty of *intellectual* clear and distinct perception. (shrink)

In Book II, Chapter xxi of An essay concerning human understanding, Locke claims that a mind's will is its power 'to order the consideration of any Idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa in any particular instance' (Il. xxi. 5).l To exercise this power (that is, to will), Locke says, is to perform an act of volition (or: willing), volitions being actions of the (...) mind directed to the performance of other actions (of the mind or body). Locke claims further that a man's being free (or at liberty) with respect to some action A is his having the power to perform or to forbear performing A according to his volition in the matter (8). Thus, X is free with respect to A if and onty if (i) X is able to perform A if he wills to perform A and (ii) X is able not to perform A if he wills not to perform A. This analysis of freedom. (shrink)

We consider various curious features of general relativity, and relativistic field theory, in two spacetime dimensions. In particular, we discuss: the vanishing of the Einstein tensor; the failure of an initial-value formulation for vacuum spacetimes; the status of singularity theorems; the non-existence of a Newtonian limit; the status of the cosmological constant; and the character of matter fields, including perfect fluids and electromagnetic fields. We conclude with a discussion of what constrains our understanding of physics in different dimensions.

The concept of emergence is commonly invoked in modern physics but rarely defined. Building on recent influential work by Jeremy Butterfield, I provide precise definitions of emergence concepts as they pertain to properties represented in models, applying them to some basic examples from space-time and thermostatistical physics. The chief formal innovation I employ, similarity structure, consists in a structured set of similarity relations among those models under analysis—and their properties—and is a generalization of topological structure. Although motivated from physics, this (...) similarity-structure-based account of emergence applies to any science that represents its possibilia with models. (shrink)

In this two-part essay, we distinguish several senses in which general relativity has been regarded as “locally special relativistic.” Here, in Part 1, we focus on senses in which a relativistic spacetime has been said to be “locally (approximately) Minkowskian.” After critiquing several proposals in the literature, we present a result capturing a substantive sense in which every relativistic spacetime is locally approximately Minkowskian. We then show that Minkowski spacetime is not distinguished in this result: every relativistic spacetime is locally (...) approximately every other spacetime in the same sense. In Part 2, we will consider “locally specially relativistic” matter theories. (shrink)

In the First Section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that a good-willed person “under subjective limitations and hindrances” (G 397) is required “never to act except in such a way that [she] could also will that [her] maxim should become a universal law” (G 402).2 This requirement has come to be known as the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) version of the Categorical Imperative, an “ought” statement expressing a command of reason that “represent[s] an action (...) as objectively necessary of itself, without reference to another end” (G 414). The question of how to understand and apply the FUL has received a great deal of attention in recent years. But Kant’s reasoning for the claim that a good-willed person (of a certain kind) acts in accordance with the FUL has not been investigated with the same degree of thoroughness. My purpose in this paper is to render the structure of Kant’s argument perspicuous, and thereby contribute to its proper evaluation by identifying its true strengths and weaknesses.3 Let us call Kant’s argument “K” and its conclusion “C”. The task at hand requires identification of K’s premises and of the reasoning by means of which C is derived. One of the advantages of clarifying K’s structure in this way is that doing so permits us to answer questions that continue to puzzle even the most sympathetic readers of the First Section. Some of these questions concern three “Propositions” to which Kant 1 draws our attention in the course of his presentation. The First Proposition (call it “P1”) is left unstated, but most commentators agree that it (or at least part of it) should be rendered as follows: (P1) A human action has moral worth only if it is done from duty.4 Kant states the other two propositions (call the Second “P2” and Third “P3”) explicitly: (P2) An action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon. (G 399). (shrink)

Plato's Parmenides divides up into two main parts, the first ostensibly devoted to a series of criticisms launched by a venerable Parmenides against a theory of Forms previously articulated by a youthful Socrates, the second consisting of a virtually unbroken series of deductions to seemingly incompatible conclusions. As such, the dialogue poses a serious interpretative challenge, for it is unclear what conclusions Plato expected his readers to draw from both parts and how the conclusion of Part II is supposed to (...) bear on the conclusion of Part I. (shrink)

In this two-part essay, we distinguish several senses in which general relativity has been regarded as “locally special relativistic.” In Part 1, we focused on senses in which a relativistic spacetime may be said to be “locally (approximately) Minkowskian.” Here, in Part 2, we consider what it might mean to say that a matter theory is “locally special relativistic.” We isolate and evaluate three criteria in the literature and show that they are incompatible: matter theories satisfying one will generally violate (...) others. We then consider what would happen if any of those criteria failed for a given theory. (shrink)

Merely approximate symmetry is mundane enough in physics that one rarely finds any explication of it. Among philosophers it has also received scant attention compared to exact symmetries. Herein I invite further consideration of this concept that is so essential to the practice of physics and interpretation of physical theory. After motivating why it deserves such scrutiny, I propose a minimal definition of approximate symmetry—that is, one that presupposes as little structure on a physical theory to which it is applied (...) as seems needed. Then I apply this definition to three topics: first, accounting for or explaining the symmetries of a theory emeritus in intertheoretic reduction; second, explicating and evaluating the Curie-Post principle; and third, a new account of accidental symmetry. (shrink)

If one is interested in reasoning counterfactually within a physical theory, one cannot adequately use the standard possible world semantics. As developed by Lewis and others, this semantics depends on entertaining possible worlds with miracles, worlds in which laws of nature, as described by physical theory, are violated. Van Fraassen suggested instead to use the models of a theory as worlds, but gave up on determining the needed comparative similarity relation for the semantics objectively. I present a third way, in (...) which this similarity relation is determined from properties of the models contextually relevant to the truth of the counterfactual under evaluation. After illustrating this with a simple example from thermodynamics, I draw some implications for future work, including a renewed possibility for a viable deflationary account of laws of nature. (shrink)

Despite a superficial similarity in circumstance, the dynamics of the judicial process of contract interpretation are not equivalent to the circumstances giving rise to the Primacy Dilemma. The Primacy Dilemma involves two parties; the judicial process involves a third: the court. This distinction is critical for while Wittgenstein's exposé of the Primacy Dilemma as illusion does not require that centuries of refinements to theories of contract interpretation be scrapped, it does require an abandonment of the ideal that courts “do not (...) and cannot make contracts; courts merely enforce agreements that the parties themselves have reached.”. (shrink)